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Fighting For a Way of Life: Public Lands and the Ranchers
Who Own Them - An Analysis of Colvin Cattle Co., v. United
States, 468 F.3d 803 (2006)
M. Benjamin Eichenberg*

We did not think of the great open plains, the beautiful
rolling hills, and winding streams with tangled growth as
“wild.” Only to the white man was nature a “wilderness”
and only to him was the land “infested” with “wild” animals
and “savage” people. To use it was tame. Earth was
bountiful and we were surrounded with the blessings of the
Great Mystery. Not until the hairy man from the east came
with brutal frenzy heaped injustices upon us and the
families we loved was it “wild” for us. When the very
animals of the forest began fleeing from his approach, then
it was that for us the “Wild West” began.1
I.

Introduction

Prior to the arrival of Europeans to the Western United States, there
were no local domesticable wild animals which native human populations
could have used for food production.2 However, Native Americans quickly
adopted European animals, and much of the modern conception of these
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Fulbright Grantee in Norway, where he will study climate change regulation at the
University of Oslo. Mr. Eichenberg would like to thank Professors Brian Gray and
John Leshy at U.C. Hastings, as well as Professor John D. Echeverria at Georgetown,
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copy editing, and to Tim Eichenberg.
1. LUTHER STANDING BEAR, LAND OF THE SPOTTED EAGLE 38 (University of Nebraska
Press 1978) (1933).
2. JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS,
(1999).
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peoples revolves around their mastery of horse, cow, and sheep.3 These
imported animals and the way of life they engendered became culturally
identified with the peoples of the Western United States, both native and
immigrant, and these animals are now inextricably linked to the nostalgic
popular conception of the West.
A unique chapter of the American West's storied history involves the
range wars fought on the land, in the movies, and through the courts. At
stake was ownership of the range: vast tracks of land with a spirit strong
enough to inspire a national identity. Since the inception of cattle grazing in
the West, ranchers have sought to establish private property interests in
federal grazing permits as a way to check growing federal regulation of
their livelihood,4 exemplified by passage of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) in
19345 and the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976.6
Friction between cattlemen and the government resulted in the County
Supremacy movement in the 1950s and in the Sagebrush Rebellion at the
end of the 1970s.7
In this decade, a series of court battles has encapsulated this conflict.
In Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (2006) ("Colvin Cattle") the
federal judiciary has slammed shut the door to private property rights first
opened a crack in the Hage v. United States series of cases.8 At the end of the
day, Colvin Cattle will stand for the primacy of federal law on federal land and
the futility of seeking an individual private property interest in land owned in
common by all the people of the United States (U.S.).
Cattle grazing comprises by far the most land intensive and resource
extractive use of federal lands in the United States. Livestock grazing takes
place on more than a quarter of a billion acres, a land mass more than twice
the size of California.9 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages the

3.

Id.

4. Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: the Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government,
35 ENVTL. L. 721 (2005) (exploring the federal grazing system in the West and its
relationship to the legal rule of capture relating to property rights, the capture of
government agencies by special interest groups, and the capture of American social
consciousness by the myth of the cowboy).
5.

Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (2000).

6.

Federal Land Policy Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (2000).

7. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & JOHN D. LESHY, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 777 (5th ed. 2002).
8. Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 580 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2002) (Hage III); Hage v.
United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 249 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1998) (Hage II); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed.
Cl. 147, 171 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996) (Hage I).
9. The acreage of federal land used by livestock grazing is enormous, but the
meat produced from this acreage is almost inconsequential — roughly 2 percent of
1614
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lion's share of that land, about one hundred fifty eight million acres, almost
all of which is concentrated in the eleven western states.10 In total, roughly
nineteen thousand ranchers and farmers hold federal grazing permits issued
by the BLM.11 These ranchers and farmers comprise the core opposition to
federal regulation of the rangeland. Compared to the more than three
hundred million people living in the U.S.,12 these ranchers comprise a very
small and very vocal minority advocating for a way of life stamped onto the
national consciousness by the likes of John Wayne,13 Gary Cooper,14 Elvis
Presley,15 Paul Newman and Robert Redford,16 and Henry Fonda.17 Colvin
Cattle is a strong statement that the glamorous Western ideology
represented in the movies starring these men must yield to federal
regulation of grazing on federal land.
Colvin Cattle's simple logic will have a marked effect on pending and
future eminent domain cases concerning federal grazing permits. Already,
Colvin Cattle persuaded the New Mexico Supreme Court that federal law
preempts state law with respect to property rights in federal grazing permits
in a case called Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d 882, 888 (N.M. 2007). The
precedential and persuasive value of the Colvin Cattle decision will continue
to impact cases involving federal grazing permits. While the Supreme Court
might be tempted to sway this area of law toward a Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon
style takings analysis,18 the facts in Colvin Cattle would not support this
attempt. Indeed, the Supreme Court would have to wait for a clearly defined
private property right under state law. Given the strength of the Colvin Cattle
precedent such a fact pattern is unlikely to arise any time soon.

the cattle produced in the United States comes from federal land. COGGINS
supra note 7, at 777-778.
10.

Id.

11.

Id.

ET AL.,

12. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United States (July 2007
est.), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/
us.html.
13.

THE SEARCHERS (C.V. Whitney Pictures & Warner Brothers Pictures 1956).

14.

HIGH NOON (Stanley Kramer Productions 1952).

15.

FLAMING STAR (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1960).

16. BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (Campanile Productions Inc. &
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1969).
17. ONCE UPON A TIME
Paramount Pictures, 1968).

IN THE

WEST (A Rafran-San Marco Production &

18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state law controls the definition of property for
purposes of a Fifth Amendment takings analysis).
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The Politics of Rangeland Management in the West: A Local Affair

A bare analysis of the legal issues in Colvin Cattle is a priori incomplete
because the adversaries have also put ideological concepts on trial. At stake
for the ranchers is a way of life idealizing self-sufficiency, the freedom of the
range, the cowboy of the American West, and the spirit of liberty the cowboy
represents. At stake for federal regulators are public policy concerns about
what is best for the majority of Americans, including ecosystem
management practices to reduce rangeland degradation.
In 1968, L.C. Colvin acquired the 520-acre 40 Bar Ranch, bordering the
625,000 acre Montezuma Allotment south of Tonopah, in Central Nevada.19
Control over the ranch passed from L.C. Colvin to his son, Ben Colvin, when
they formed Colvin Cattle Company, Incorporated (Colvin) in 1969 to
manage the ranch.20 Nevada is hard, dry country; the BLM estimates that, in
an average year, it takes 636 acres of land to provide adequate forage for one
cow.21 The Colvins embody the pioneer spirit in this harsh environment and
represent to many locals the ranching way of life — a way of life
characterized by self-sufficiency and a spirit of liberty.22
Ben Colvin comes from a ranching family and feels strongly about
fighting for his way of life.23 "[I]ts [sic] a good day when you can ride a horse
and work with cattle . . . I suppose the day I quit running cows will be the day
they pat me in the face with the shovel."24 In spite of his personal
dedication, none of Ben Colvin's five children will continue the ranching
trade,25 which may be one reason why he is risking his ranch to challenge
federal regulation of his grazing permits. Without these grazing permits,
Colvin's ranch, like many others in the West, would be unable to continue
cattle operations. Another reason for Ben Colvin's willingness to take risks
may derive from his bitter struggle against over-populated wild horses and
burros that negatively affect the ranch's viability, yet remain protected under

19. Corrected Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3-4, Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States,
468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 06-5012).
20.

Id.

21. Colleen Cahill, Interview: Ben Colvin Stands His Ground, CORNERSTONE, Vol. 9,
January 2002, available at http://www.stewardsoftherange.org/cornerstone/jan2002/
csjan02-1.asp.
22. Stewards of the Range, Rancher Objects to Use of Excessive Force in Roundup,
LIBERTY MATTERS, July 30, 2001, available at http://www.libertymatters.org/newsservice/
2001/faxback/7.31.01stewardspressrelease.htm.

1616

23.

Cahill, supra note 21.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.
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the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WFRHBA).26 The wild
animals' overgrazing forced herd reductions on the ranch, from nine
hundred head of cattle to fifty.27 When the BLM instituted a new Range
Management Plan (RMP) in 1994, Ben Colvin had had enough. He refused
to sign a new permit and stopped paying grazing fees.28
Colvin has grazing priority on and owns state law stockwatering rights
in the federal land comprising the Montezuma Allotment.29 Ben Colvin
explained that "[a]ccording to law, you have to use those waters within 5
years or you lose them. As long as I had my cattle off, the BLM was in a
good position to take those water rights from me."30 So Ben Colvin put his
cows back on the land and refused to sign a federal grazing permit. He
became a trespasser and a martyr for ranchers and their struggle against big
government and grinding bureaucracy.31
Ben Colvin explained that he could not be trespassing on federal land,
which he considers his own but which the BLM calls public land, because
his cattle grazing rights were lawfully acquired appurtenant to his purchase
of his private ranchland.32 "From that point forward it has not been public
land," he continued, "[m]y allotment is a privately-owned surface estate right
on federal lands."33 Ben Colvin delivered this ultimatum: "They [have] given
me no choice. I am going to pursue this one to the end."34
From the BLM's point of view, ranchers like Ben Colvin and neighbor
Jack Vogt were flouting the law and the agency had run out of negotiating
options.35 Colvin owed $72,000 in fines and grazing fees accrued over the
roughly six years since his first refusal to pay.36 Vogt's infractions were even

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28. Ben Colvin claims that range surveys determined overgrazing as a result of
starving horses and burros, not his cattle, and that the RMP was unfairly imposed on
him as a result of gross BLM mismanagement. “I would’ve still been signing my
permit and paying my grazing fees if they had taken those horses down to economic
levels.” Id.
29.

Colvin Cattle Co., v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

30.

Cahill, supra note 21.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Stewards of the Range, supra note 22.

34.

Id.

35. Jon Christensen, Showdown on the Nevada Range, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, August
27, 2001, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=10672.
36.

Id.
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more egregious, totaling a whopping $237,000.37 In 2001, the BLM had no
other options and impounded the cows.38
Contract cowboys in helicopters working for the BLM impounded sixtytwo head of Colvin cattle from federal lands.39 According to the BLM's press
release, "[t]he livestock [had] been grazing on and off public lands without a
permit or without authorization for more than five years."40 All those
involved in the seizure came under immediate scrutiny from local officials
and cattle activists — scrutiny headlined by Ex-Representative Helen
Chenoweth-Hage and her citizen petition drive for a grand jury investigation
of James Connelley, the state brand inspector for Esmeralda County.41 As
brand inspector, Connelley was a local government official authorizing
federal ownership of the seized cows, thus making himself into a lightning rod
for local outrage.42 Ben Colvin took action as well, swearing out a warrant for
"the arrest of all those involved in the taking of his property without due
process of law."43 Local sentiment was firmly on the side of the Colvins.
Local resistance mounted as the auction of Colvin and Vogt's
impounded cows approached. Protestors lined the auction yard, motivated
by the prevailing sentiment that the BLM had engaged in cattle rustling, a
capital offense in the protesters' opinions.44 According to the Nevada
Committee for Full Statehood, which organized the protest, "[Nevada
residents are] not sovereign citizens. We're serfs under King BLM and King
Forest Service."45 It should come as no surprise that no one bid on the cattle.46
Many ranchers in Nevada and across the West have deep-rooted
ideological problems with federal agency management of the rangeland in
general.47 They ask questions such as "[d]id the Founding Fathers really

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39. JoLynn Worley, BLM Takes Action on Livestock Trespass, Bureau of Land
Management, Release Number: 2001-63, July 27, 2001, available at
http://www.nv.blm.gov/news_releases/Press_Releases/fy_2001/PR_01_63.htm.
40.

Id.

41. Scott Sonner, Chenoweth-Hage Seeks Cattle Seizure Probe, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE,
September 6, 2003, available at http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2003/09/06/
news/wyoming/cd9d21655e3d6d65961a7878960e92f8.txt.
42.

Id.

43.

Stewards of the Range, supra note 22.

44.

Christensen, supra note 35.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47. Susan Searcy, Special Collections: a Guide to the Records of The Sagebrush Rebellion,
Collection No. 85-04, University of Nevada, Reno Libraries (2006), available at
http://www.library.unr.edu/specoll/mss/85-04.html.
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intend for the federal government to permanently own 87 percent of Nevada
. . . 68 percent of Utah . . . for as long as the sun shall shine?"48 According to
interviews with agency officials reported in High Country News in 2001, there
are more cases like this one just waiting to happen.49 These ranchers seem
willing to sacrifice everything in the fight for control over the land and their
ideal of freedom.50 In some cases they may feel as though they have nothing
to lose as BLM permit requirements drive them to the brink of bankruptcy.51
This unrest implicates the BLM's ability to manage public lands in the face
of resistance from local ranchers.
III.

The Battle in Court

In its final decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit upheld a Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of Colvin's takings and
contract claims in its entirety.52 These claims can be broken down into six
parts: first, Colvin claimed a government taking of its private property in
grazing rights on federal land obtained with the purchase of its ranch and
appurtenant to its state law stockwatering rights; second, Colvin claimed the
reduction in the value of its ranch due to the loss of these grazing rights also
constituted a taking; third, Colvin claimed that its state stockwatering rights
had been taken by private parties; fourth, that its state stockwatering rights
had been taken by animals under the control of the BLM; fifth, Colvin
claimed breach of contract, as an alternative to claim one; and sixth, Colvin
claimed the value of range improvements it had installed on the federal land
under a compensation provision of FLPMA.53
A.

The Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence

Takings jurisprudence stems directly from the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which states, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."54 For the purpose of

48. Editorial, They Used to be Called Rustlers, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, August 5,
2001, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2001/Aug-05-Sun-2001/
opinion/16696857.html.
49.

Christensen, supra note 35.

50.

Id.

51.

Wayne Hage, Nevada Rancher Challenges the Grazing Permit System,
CORNERSTONE, Vol. 8, September 2001, available at http://www.stewardsoftherange.org/
cornerstone/sept2001/cssept01-2.asp.
52.

Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

53.

Id. at 806; 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (2000).

54.

U.S. CONST. amend V.
1619
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addressing Colvin's claims, a court must first address the "private property"
aspect of the Amendment, without which there can be no taking.55 A further
crucial distinction stems from the "taken" aspect of the clause and the extent
to which a property interest need be compromised before the court will find
a taking.
The long and complex history of Supreme Court interpretation of the
takings clause boils down to three principle cases. In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Court established a
set of factors of particular significance to what it called an "essentially ad
hoc, factual inquir[y]" to determine when a taking has occurred due to
government regulation.56 These factors are: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation;57 (2) the interference of the regulation with the investmentbacked expectations of a private property owner; and (3) the character of the
government action as between the poles of a physical invasion of private
property (more likely to be a taking) and a mere adjustment of the "benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."58 This multifactor takings calculus seldom results in a taking, largely because there are
no fixed, applicable standards and concepts such as "the common good" are
extremely flexible. These manipulable standards provide government
entities with a great deal of leeway.59

55. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) (no property right is
created in grazing permits where lands to be aggregated are themselves owned by
the condemnor and used by the condemnee only under revocable permit from the
condemnor, as is the case with federal lands administered under the TGA).
56.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

57. “The Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes
with legitimate property interests.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540
(2005) (the magnitude or character of the burden placed upon private property rights,
rather than the legislative intent of such a burden, is the sole basis for a
determination of Fifth Amendment takings).
58.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

59. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566 (the diminution in value test has been applied by
courts on the basis of undisclosed, ad hoc value judgments); Karl Manheim, Tenant
Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 925, 1019 (takings cases are
often marked by a lack of structure and there is great difficulty in establishing
coherent or enduring rules in this area, as evidenced by the lack of a stable majority
in the Supreme Court on these cases).
1620
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Penn Central is bordered by two per se takings rules.60 The first of these
rules was established in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CatV Corporation, 458
U.S. 419 (1982):
We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical
occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the
property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation
of compensation, and the character of the invasion is
qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other
category of property regulation. We do not, however,
question the equally substantial authority upholding a
State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions
upon an owner's use of his property. 61
Applying this doctrine to water rights implicates some very obvious
physical difficulties.62 Holding a stream or a pond in your hands is no easy
task — doing so would be no less a Sisyphean task than that of applying real
property law to a dynamic resource like water.
The other per se rule of takings jurisprudence has a more facile
application to water law, though not one without its share of controversy.63
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that "there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief
that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."64 In other
words, if a regulation renders private property economically worthless, such
regulation constitutes a taking.65 However, an imaginative lawyer can often

60. “Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that
generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. . . . Outside
these two relatively narrow categories . . . regulatory takings challenges are governed
by the standards set forth in Penn Central.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citations omitted).
61.

Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441 (emphasis in original).

62. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (federal government water use restrictions under the Endangered Species Act
were held to be a per se physical taking of plaintiffs’ water rights under Loretto).
63. See, e.g., Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996) (judgment
of the district court affirmed because an en banc court was equally divided, seven
members in favor of affirmation and seven in favor of reversal, affirmation meaning
that riparian, and other valid existing rights, are not ossified against further
regulation, in spite of congressional language acknowledging the existence of such
rights in the wilderness acts).
64.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.

65.

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 346 (2002).
1621
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come up with an economically viable use for a piece of real property,
substantially narrowing the scope of this rule.66
B.

Basis of the Colvin Cattle Decision

The foundational assumption of the court's decision in Colvin Cattle is
that Congress possesses power analogous to state police power over federal
lands.67 This assumption is based on the Property Clause of the United
States Constitution, Article IV, Section Three, Clause Two. United States v.
Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840) interpreted this clause to mean that congressional
power to regulate federal land is essentially unlimited: "Congress has the
same power over [the public lands] as over any other property belonging to
the United States; and this power is vested in Congress without limitation."68
This means that the federal government's allowance of grazing on public
land does not confer any vested right, nor does it deprive the federal
government of the power to recall any implied license under which the land
had been used for private purposes.69 Because of the assumption of
congressional supremacy, which both parties in Colvin Cattle conceded,
Congress must specifically authorize any property right before it can vest.70
And, as the above discussion points out, a vested property right is absolutely
necessary to support a finding of unlawful government appropriation.71
Congressional action on grazing is concentrated in two major statutes:
the TGA72 and FLPMA.73 The court in Colvin Cattle found that "[b]ecause the
vesting of any property right to graze on public lands subsequent to the

66. Id. (“The Court does not dispute that petitioners were forced to leave their
land economically idle during this period. . . . But the Court refuses to apply Lucas on
the ground that the deprivation was ‘temporary.’”); see also, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606 (2001) (property owner failed to show deprivation of all economic value
where a residence could be built on the land under the challenged regulation); see,
e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property
Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (suggesting that Justice
Scalia may have overplayed his hand by trying to change the law in one fell swoop,
and that the oddness of the factual basis in Lucas and the background principles
rationale used by Scalia’s majority opinion in the case have marginalized its value
as precedent).
67.

Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

68.

Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 537.

69.

Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).

70.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807.
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973).

72.

43 U.S.C. § 315, et seq (2000).

73.

43 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq (2000).
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enactment of the TGA would be inconsistent with the act, any grazing right
that Colvin possesses necessarily must have vested prior to its enactment."74
Prior to 1934, all grazing on public lands was under an implied license, left
open only so long as the government did not cancel its silent consent.75
Based on the absolute supremacy of congressional authority in this area, the
court in Colvin Cattle found that "any water right that Colvin or its
predecessors obtained could not and did not include an attendant right to
graze on public lands."76 To hold otherwise in Colvin Cattle, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit would have implicitly brought Supreme Court
precedent in cases like Fuller, Light, and Gratiot into question by carving out a
previously non-existent exception to absolute congressional authority over
federal lands for water rights vested under state law.
Despite this seemingly absolute statement concerning federal law, the
court nonetheless moved the discussion to state law.77 It appears that the
court gave its imprimatur to Colvin's analysis of the Mining Act of 1866
(Mining Act), stating that Colvin's "argument begins well enough" in
following the Mining Act to a reliance on Nevada law.78 However, the court
concluded that there is ultimately no basis in Nevada law for a right to graze
appurtenant to state stockwatering rights.79
C.

Applying the Basis of the Decision to Colvin's Claims

The court used a two prong approach, established by M & J Coal Co. and
Monongah Development Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995), to
analyze takings claims involving land use restrictions, concluding that Colvin

74.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807.

75. Id., citing Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911). See also
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918) (while states can regulate activity on
federal land, state law is trumped by federal law and the states can not create any
sort of legally protected interest in federal lands); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326
(1890) (failure by the federal government to object to a particular use of public land
does not vest private property rights in such use).
76.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807.

77.

Id.

78. Id. (citations omitted). (“[U]nder the Mining Act of 1866 and the TGA, the
United States recognizes vested state law-based water rights.”).
79. Id. at 807-08. This, in fact, is the most exhaustive section of the court’s
decision and includes a survey of the Nevada Stockwatering Act and Nevada
Supreme Court cases In re Calvo, 253 P. 671 (Nev. 1927), Itcaina v. Marble, 55 P.2d 625
(Nev. 1936), and Ansolabehere v. Laborde, 310 P.2d 842 (Nev. 1957). The conclusions the
court in Colvin Cattle reaches, based upon Nevada law, will be addressed in V. Analysis
of the Decision in Colvin Cattle, infra.
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could not get past the first prong.80 Under this first prong, a use interest
must be part of the owner's title at the time of purchase if government
interference with the use is to constitute a taking.81 "If the claimant can
establish the existence of such an interest," the second prong asks "whether
the governmental action at issue constituted a compensable taking of that
[use interest]."82 Citing both M & J Coal and Lucas, the court in Colvin Cattle
found that "[Colvin's] claim fails because, under the first prong, grazing is
not a stick in the bundle of rights that it has ever acquired."83 Basing its
argument on Lucas, the court pointed out that there can be no per se taking
unless the first prong of M & J Coal is satisfied.84 Even a change in a grazing
permit which renders a protected property right valueless would not be
enough to satisfy the first prong of M & J Coal because the grazing permit
itself is not a protected property right under state law.85 Thus, the court
decided against Colvin on its first claim that the BLM's revocation of its
grazing allotment constituted a taking of Colvin's water rights.86
Because Colvin has no protected property interest in its grazing
allotment under state law, and because of Supreme Court precedent,87 the
court in Colvin Cattle found that any diminution of value of the ranch by BLM
grazing restrictions is also non-compensable.88 The court explained that
"such loss in value [from a revoked grazing permit] has not occurred by
virtue of governmental restrictions on a constitutionally cognizable property
interest."89 Thus, Colvin's second claim was invalid because a takings claim

80.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d. at 808.

81.

M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

82.

Id.

83. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d. at 808 (citing M & J Coal, 47 F.3d at 1153-54). This
“bundle of rights” language is drawn from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“Our ‘takings’ jurisprudence . . . has traditionally been guided
by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power
over, the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they obtain title to property. . . .
[T]he property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be
restricted . . . by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate
exercise of its police powers.”).
84.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d. at 808.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027;
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973).
88.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 808.

89. Id. (holding that “the Fifth Amendment does not require the Government to
pay for that element of value based on the use of respondent’s fee lands in
1624

4/20/2008 8:09:09 AM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

cannot be based on a property value conferred by the United States under a
revocable permit.90 Once again, the court's rationale was firmly centered on
the nature of the property interest claimed by Colvin, revealing the vital role
played by the definition of state property rights under the Supreme Court's
takings jurisprudence.91
Colvin's third claim, that the BLM allowed Colvin's successor to
infringe on Colvin's water rights, was dismissed for two reasons.92 The first
reason was that the BLM stipulated in the grazing permit issued to Bud
Johnson (the private party authorized to graze on the Montezuma Allotment
in Colvin's place) that he had to haul all of his own water and could not use
Colvin's water rights.93 The second reason was that "the United States
cannot be held responsible for the incursion on water rights by a private
party."94 Bud Johnson is not an instrument of the government, thus the
government cannot be held responsible for his actions.95
This discussion of the instrumentality of third parties led directly to
the invalidation of Colvin's fourth claim.96 The court in Colvin Cattle held that
the federal government is no more responsible for the actions of wild horses
than it is for the actions of private parties.97 The court explained that,
"because wild horses are outside the government's control, they cannot
constitute an instrumentality of the government capable of giving rise to a
taking."98 Horses, like other wild animals, are independent actors rather
than agents of the government.99 Moreover, the rancher's dominion over the

combination with the Government’s permit lands.” (quoting Fuller, 409 U.S. at 493
(emphasis in original))).
90.

Fuller, 409 U.S. at 493.

91. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (citation omitted)
(“If Congress can ‘pre-empt’ state property law . . . then the Taking Clause has lost all
vitality. . . . [A] sovereign, ‘by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public
property without compensation. . . . This is the very kind of thing that the Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.’”) See also Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (decision based upon the existence under Pennsylvania law of a
separate and very important support estate).
92.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 808-09.

93.

Id. at 806.

94.

Id. at 809 (citing Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

Id. (citing Alves, 133 F.3d at 1457-58 (citations omitted)).

99. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986) (no
possible takings claim because horses are wild animals and are not agents of the
federal government).
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parcel as a whole is still largely intact, tipping the balance in Colvin Cattle
against a claim of complete government appropriation.100
Though the court in Colvin Cattle did not specifically address the point,
it is clear that the economic impact on the property as a whole did not raise
Colvin's claim to the level of a taking. Colvin still has the right to access its
water and exclude private users and wild animals alike.101 "Although Colvin
may no longer access the allotment for grazing purposes, the government
has not impeded its access to water."102 The Supreme Court, in Mountain
States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, addressed the issue of wild animals as well:
"[a]dmittedly, the grazing habits of the wild horses has [sic] diminished the
value of the . . . property. But a reduction in the value of property is not
necessarily equated with a taking."103 A long line of precedent supports the
Colvin Cattle court's implied stance that diminution in value alone is not
enough to constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.104
Colvin's contract claim was based on his permit with the BLM, and the
court eliminated this claim on a jurisdictional flaw without ever reaching the
facts of the case.105 Because suit was not filed until 1993, more than eight
years after Colvin's failure to pay, any breach of contract claim was barred by
the statute of limitations imposed in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2501.106
Therefore, the court in Colvin Cattle left unresolved the question of whether a
breach of contract claim can be brought at all under TGA § 315(b) lease.107
Finally, the court cited another jurisdictional issue to defeat Colvin's
sixth and final claim concerning compensation under FLPMA for range

100. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978), (“Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated.”)
101.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 806.

102.

Id.

103.

Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1430-31.

104. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (“[A] showing of diminution in property
value would not establish a ‘taking’ if the restriction had been imposed as a result of
historic-district legislation . . ..”). See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405
(1915) (92.5% diminution in value is insufficient to establish a taking); Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (75 percent diminution in value is insufficient to
establish a taking); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc., v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust.,
508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (“mere diminution in the value of property, however serious,
is insufficient to demonstrate a taking”).
Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 809.

106.

Id.

107.

Id.
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improvements.108 FLPMA requires a request be submitted to the Secretary of
the Interior for a determination of the value of improvements as a
prerequisite for a compensation claim.109 Accordingly, the court ruled that
Colvin's claim was not ripe for adjudication because Colvin failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by requesting a value estimate.110
IV.

Resulting Issues

Colvin Cattle, at about twelve pages, represents the median length of a
decision published by the Federal Circuit.111 As such, it is no great surprise
that Colvin Cattle leaves some issues in this controversial area of law
unanswered. One such issue is that the court did not squarely confront the
Mining Act's grant of congressional authority to the states to determine
private property rights on public land.112 As a result, it left the door open for
further federal court involvement in state law interpretation. Given the
national character of the Court of Federal Claims and its home in
Washington, D.C., judges involved in future cases may well prove to be wary
of over-involvement in state law disputes with which they have little or no
experience.113 This may well result in a trend toward the certification of state
law issues to state supreme courts, as in Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl.
222 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005) (No. 29,544),114 significantly drawing out the time it
takes to resolve a case involving water rights on federal lands.

108.

Id.

109.

43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (2000).

110. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 809; see also, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938) (rule requiring the exhaustion of an administrative
remedy cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the
complaint rests is groundless).
111. A brief Lexis survey reveals that of the seven published decisions issued
in 2006 from the panel of Judge Mayer, Judge Newman, and Judge Rader, the longest
decision is fifteen pages while the shortest is five pages, with Colvin Cattle squarely in
the median at twelve pages.
112.

See V. Analysis of the Decision in Colvin Cattle, infra, as well as note 78, supra.

113.

See VI. Analysis of Related Cases in Light of Colvin Cattle, infra.

114. Two questions of state property law were certified by the Court of Federal
Claims to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Walker: “1. Does the law of the State of
New Mexico recognize a limited forage right implicit in a vested water right? 2. Does
the law of the State of New Mexico law [sic] recognize a limited forage right implicit
in a right-of-way for the maintenance and enjoyment of a vested water right?” Walker,
69 Fed. Cl. at 232-33. Walker is addressed in detail in VI. Analysis of Related Cases in
Light of Colvin Cattle, infra. For more on certification of state law issues to state
supreme courts, see Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997)
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The Federal Circuit is the binding authority for a majority of the cases
brought against the federal government because it handles appeals from the
Court of Federal Claims.115 Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1997),
the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over cases against the
government where damages exceed $10,000.116 Because the median price of
a parcel of land in the United States is significantly greater than $10,000, the
vast majority of property claims are quite likely to exceed this relatively low
jurisdictional threshold.117 Because the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over
appeals from the Court of Federal Claims,118 it will set the tone of the lower
court's takings jurisprudence.
V.

Analysis of the Decision in Colvin Cattle

In Colvin Cattle, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took a
strong stance on federal rangeland policy and a bona fide first step toward
reversing a disturbing trend toward an increase in grazing permit litigation.
The key to this stance rests in the court's disposal of state law issues.

(“Certification procedure . . . allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law
question to put the question directly to the State's highest court, reducing the delay,
cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative
response.”); Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001); Northland Family
Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 343 (6th Cir. 2007); Psinet, Inc. v. Chapman, 317
F.3d 413, 424 (4th Cir. 2003); and Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 84 (2d Cir. 2000).
115. Under 28 U.S.C § 1295(a)(3) (2000), “[t]he United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final
decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims.” The Federal Circuit also has
appellate jurisdiction over the Boards of Contract Appeals, the United States
International Trade Commission, and the United States Court of International Trade,
as well as certain other types of appeals from the United States District Courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1295.
116. While 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)(1997) limits the jurisdiction of the district
courts to any “civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $ 10,000
in amount,” the Court of Federal Claims is not so limited: “The United States Court of
Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2001).
117. According to the United States Census Bureau, the median and average
sales prices of new homes sold in the United States in 2006 were $246,500 and
$305,900, respectively. U.S. Census Bureau, Median and Average Sales Prices of New Homes
Sold in United States, Annual Data, available at http://www.census.gov/const/uspriceann.pdf.
118.
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Federal takings jurisprudence, as it applies to the overlap of TGA grazing
permits and state water rights, tends to be steered back to state supreme
courts for determinations of state property law. This course is largely
mandated by the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Federal
Circuit adds its own imprimatur to certification procedures.
It was convenient for the Federal Circuit that the Nevada Supreme
Court left a swath of jurisprudence stating that there is no property right
established by the Stockwatering Act of 1925, the primary basis for Colvin's
claim. This swath is wide enough to withstand U.S. Supreme Court review,
something that the Federal Circuit must be especially mindful of.119 In the
wake of backlash from Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005),120 the
conservative members of the Court are likely eager to reassert their property
rights credentials. Other cases addressing similar issues have not been so
clear because they concern state laws less clear than Nevada's, resulting in a
cautious Court of Federal Claims opting to certify vital questions of state
property law to state supreme courts.
A.

Federal Law Can Stand Alone

The Federal Circuit in Colvin Cattle may have partially based its decision
on state law,121 but state law was unnecessary for the court's ultimate
conclusion. According to the opinion issued by the Court of Federal Claims,
affirmed by Colvin Cattle, there is adequate jurisprudence to support the
notion that state water rights confer, if anything, only minimal, narrow rights
of access.122 The lower court explained that "the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have expressly rejected the assertion that a right to graze on federal lands is
attendant to a state water right."123 While the Federal Circuit declined to
address the issue in as much detail, its support for the lower court's
reasoning is clear.124
The federal issues are spelled out by the Federal Circuit in a simple
and straightforward manner that admits of no possibility that a rancher
could possess some sort of vested property right in a federal grazing

119.

See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.

120. Holding that a disposition of property to increase tax revenue and
revitalize economically blighted areas of the City of New London qualifies as a public
use under Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493.
121.

Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 807-08 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

122.

Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 568, 574 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005).

123.

Id. (citations omitted).

124. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 808 (“[G]razing is not a stick in the bundle of
rights that [Colvin] has ever acquired.”).
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permit.125 State property law is irrelevant, the court says, because state law
"could not have conferred such a [property] right, even if it had tried.
Because the Montezuma Allotment is and always has been federal land, no
right in it may be obtained without congressional authorization."126 In an
ideal world, the court would not have confused the issue by including the
state law rationale as more than a footnote, instead basing its decision
wholly on the strong foundation of federal law in this area.127 However, the
Colvin Cattle decision is clear enough precedent that future litigation should
be able to avoid certification — a desirable outcome because of the
complicated and time-consuming procedures involved in certifying a
question for state court review.128
Beyond the four corners of the Colvin decision, there is robust support
for the notion that grazing permits and related leases or preferences confer
no compensable property right in the underlying federal land. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the BLM has the discretion to reclassify or
withdraw rangeland from grazing use, alter internal regulations concerning
grazing permits, and either adjust an individual permit's cattle numbers or
cancel the permit altogether in cases of misuse.129 Fuller, discussed earlier,

125.
126.
1925.

Id.
Id. The court is specifically referring to the Nevada Stockwatering Act of

127. See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1967) (grant of
water rights does not carry with it an easement to graze because grazing is not
essential to the use of the water right); Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d
1209 (10th Cir. 1999) (New Mexico law does not attach a private property right to
graze on federal lands to vested stockwatering rights); see also, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529, 539-41 (1976) (congressional power over the public lands is that of both a
proprietor and a legislator, necessarily including the power to regulate and protect
wildlife on federal land, and as such should be broadly construed and is unlimited by
the laws of the states).
128. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Symposium on Tomorrow’s Issues in State
Constitutional Law: Is Making State Constitutional Law Through Certified Questions a Good Idea
or a Bad Idea? 38 VAL. U.L. REV. 327 (2004). Alternatively, for a defense of certification,
see The Council on Judicial Administration and the Committee on Federal Courts,
Report and Recommendations on Second Circuit Certification of Determinative State Law Issues to
the New York Court of Appeals, 54 THE RECORD 310 (1999). Both sides seem to agree,
however, that certification imposes significant additional litigation costs and delays
on the parties involved. 54 The Record at 313-14.
129. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 742-43 (2000) (Secretary of the
Interior did not exceed his authority under the TGA by amending regulations
governing grazing preferences, permit issuance, and ownership of range
improvements).
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makes clear that the Court does not read the TGA to create any
compensable property right in permit lands.130
The courts of appeal have also weighed in against the notion that a
property right has been created by grazing permits. The Tenth Circuit
explained that because such permits confer a privilege rather than a right,
they do not constitute property as defined in the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause.131 The Federal Circuit came to the same conclusion in Alves.132 Even
Hage v. United States, a series of cases presided over by Chief Judge Loren
Smith of the Court of Federal Claims and representing the most success
ranchers have had in this area, found only a limited right to graze within fifty
feet of a water-filled ditch in which a state law water right has vested under
the Mining Act.133
B.

Potential for an Appeal to the United States Supreme Court

Colvin's petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the Federal
Circuit in February of 2007.134 Given Ben Colvin's personal and ideological
circumstances and the binding nature of any precedent set by the Federal
Circuit,135 an appeal of this decision to the United States Supreme Court
might have appeared a foregone conclusion. Ben Colvin had claimed to
have committed himself to see the process through, and support for his

130. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (“[t]he provisions of the
[TGA] quoted supra make clear the congressional intent that no compensable
property might be created in the permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance
of the permit”).
131. Federal Lands Legal Consortium v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir.
1999) (citing United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir. 1951) (“Although the
permits are valuable to the ranchers, they are not an interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment against the taking by the Government who granted them with the
understanding that they could be withdrawn at any time without the payment of
compensation.”)).
132. Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also,
Diamond Bar Cattle Co., 168 F.3d at 1217 (“license was revocable at the government’s
pleasure and conferred no right in plaintiffs or their predecessors to graze a specific
allotment of land”).
133. 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 580 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2002) (plaintiffs have at most a right to
access the water in which they have a vested right); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl.
147, 171 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996) (“the court emphasizes that plaintiffs’ investment-backed
expectations and reliance on the privilege to graze do not, in themselves, create a
property interest in the rangeland or the permit”).
134. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, No. 06-5012, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4460 at
*1-2 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
135.

See IV. Resulting Issues, supra.
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cause in rural Nevada should be as strong today as it was six years ago at
the auction house.136 Moreover, controversial cases concerning private
property rights, like Colvin Cattle, can acquire a life of their as interested
parties become aware of the litigation's progress. However, Colvin's time to
file a petition for writ of certiorari has passed without the parties seeking
certification. This final conclusion to the Colvin Cattle litigation reflects the
clarity of the Court of Federal Claims' decision — if there were any way to
keep the litigation alive, property rights advocates have repeatedly proven
that their strategy is to do so. Thus, if this issue is to receive the attention of
the Supreme Court, it will have to be under a different fact pattern from the
one in Colvin Cattle.
Colvin's arguments, both in the Court of Federal Claims and on appeal
to the Federal Circuit, utilized classic takings language in an attempt to add
grazing to a burgeoning collection of limitations on federal power
engineered during the term of the Rehnquist Court.137 Chief Justice Roberts
has engaged in some takings jurisprudence as an advocate, but his
involvement revealed very little of what his stance on takings as Chief Justice
might be.138 With both Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor139 gone, and
other changes in the constitution of the Court perhaps not far behind,140 it

136.

Christensen, supra note 35.

137. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906 (2006); Thomas H. Odom, An Introduction to
the Symposium on the Federalism Decisions of the Supreme Court’s 1999 Term, 25 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REV. 783 (2000); Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2002).
138. Compare Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) (Roberts successfully represented environmentalists fighting development
around Lake Tahoe), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Roberts coauthored the government’s successful brief opposing environmental organizational
standing to sue in Article III courts).
139. Justice O’Connor’s childhood on a ranch in the Southwestern United
States likely soured her on the bureaucracy of federal regulation. Tyson R. Smith,
Shades of Green: Justice O’Connor and the Environment, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 365, 367, 380
(2003).
140. “A stent was inserted to clear an arterial blockage near Kennedy's heart
over the Labor Day weekend after the justice experienced chest pains. . . . he was
released from the hospital the next day. He was back at work the day after that.” Bill
Mears, Justice Kennedy Works on His Swing, CNN LAW CENTER, September 29, 2006,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/25/scotus.kennedy/index.html. Mears
also points out that Justice O’Connor’s retirement makes Kennedy the most
important vote on the Supreme Court, with four liberals to his left and four
conservatives on his right.
1632

4/20/2008 8:09:09 AM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

remains to be seen in what direction the Court will move on the
controversial and muddled topic of takings.141
Colvin's argument that federal grazing permits vest private property
rights evokes Justice Holmes's rhetoric from Pennsylvania Coal.142 Language
from Pennsylvania Coal drew the ideological lines that make up modern
takings jurisprudence.143 On the one hand, "[g]overnment hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law."144 However, Justice
Holmes continues, "[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change."145 It is this latter sentiment that Colvin attempts to capture, and
one from which Justice Scalia's takings stance derives:146 "[w]e have
repeatedly observed that the purpose of [the Fifth Amendment takings
provision] is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'"147 This
language could be applied to Colvin Cattle in the sense that individual
ranchers are being forced to bear the burden of ecosystem management, a
burden which some say should rather be born by the public as a whole. This
sort of rhetoric can only increase the likelihood of seeing a similar case
before the Supreme Court.
The most important equity argument from Pennsylvania Coal for the
purposes of such future litigation lies in Justice Holmes' rhetoric.
Pennsylvania Coal involved the right of a coal mining company to remove coal
from the ground, a right which represented a protected property interest
under Pennsylvania law.148 Justice Holmes explains that, "the right to coal
consists in the right to mine it . . . What makes the right to mine coal
valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially

141. Rehnquist died in September of 2005; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005), the last Supreme Court decision addressing Fifth Amendment private
property rights, was handed down on June 23. Charles Lane, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist Dies, WASHINGTON POST, September 4, 2005 at A1.
142. Corrected Reply Brief at 23, Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.3d
803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 06-5012).
143.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).

144.

Id. at 413.

145.

Id. at 416.

146. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) and
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992).
147. Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19 (1988) (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364
U. S. 40, 49 (1960)) (emphasis added).
148.

Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
1633

4/20/2008 8:09:09 AM

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."149 Even though
Pennsylvania Coal was essentially overturned on its facts by Keystone Bituminous
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,150 the modern Supreme Court appears to favor
the rhetoric of its earlier decision.151 Thus, a favorable comparison to
Pennsylvania Coal would almost certainly make its way into any future
Supreme Court treatment of this issue.
Colvin draws such an analogy in its appellate brief, underscoring the
similarities between the right to coal in place and the right to water in
place.152 "Water rights cannot exist without a right to place the water to
beneficial use, and Colvin has alleged that its water rights were created
under local law and custom for the sole beneficial purpose of
stockwatering."153 For practical purposes, it is fairly obvious that the right to
water for Colvin consists in the right to water his stock.154 Under the
Pennsylvania Coal rationale, Colvin argued that prohibiting him from
watering his stock was equivalent to destroying his property interest in his
water rights.155

149.

Id. at 415 (citations omitted).

150. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Keystone held that a Pennsylvania statute restricting
mining operations in order to prevent subsidence did not constitute a taking.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506.
151. That, at least, was the preference of Justices Scalia and Rehnquist. See
notes 137-38, supra. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote many of the takings decisions
supporting this theory. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391 (1994)
(exactions required by a governmental agency as a result of a permitting process
must be roughly proportionate to the projected impact of the proposed
development, and there must also be an essential nexus between a legitimate state
interest and the permit condition) and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321-22 (1987) (governmental action constituting a taking
can not be undone by invalidating the suspect law).
152.

Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.

153. Corrected Reply Brief at 9, Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 06-5012).
154. See, e.g., Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 175 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996)
(“Plaintiffs assert that in Nevada the right to bring cattle to the water, and for cattle
to consume forage adjacent to a private water right, is inherently part of the vested
stockwater right. Obviously, there is some logical support for this proposition even in
light of the small amount of knowledge of bovine behavior held by the court.” The
Hage cases are covered in more depth in VI. Analysis of Related Cases in Light of
Colvin Cattle, infra.
155.
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The equity aspects of an apparent government property appropriation,
such as the conflict over water rights in Colvin Cattle, could speak
persuasively to a country outraged by the governmental appropriation of
family homes156 in Kelo.157 However, the Supreme Court has clearly
disavowed much of the rationale remaining from Pennsylvania Coal and
generally allows government regulators free reign with policy decisions.158 In
the end, without a justice as connected to Western grazing issues as Justice
O'Connor was,159 a Supreme Court wary of public outrage will most likely
keep its distance unless it sees an opportunity to right the perceived wrongs
of Kelo.
A quick survey of the eleven Western states shows that it would be
unlikely for a case to arise in which the Supreme Court could find that state
property rights had been taken. Nevada law has been covered already, and
Section VI. B. of this Comment shows that the New Mexico Supreme Court
believes no such interest exists there. The California Supreme Court agrees,
stating that "the holder of a federal grazing permit is, for the purpose of
eminent domain proceedings, a licensee without compensable property
rights."160 While there is no Arizona Supreme Court precedent on this issue,
a 1973 appellate case is on point and has received sufficient subsequent
positive treatment to render it persuasive here. Tidwell v. State holds that
"Appellants' permit from the federal government was a mere license and
gave them no estate or property right in the land."161
The Colorado Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue
either, but does refer favorably to Arizona jurisprudence and cites to the

156. See, e.g., T.R. Reid, Missouri Condemnation No Longer So Imminent: Supreme
Court Ruling Ignites Political Backlash, WASHINGTON POST, September 6, 2005, at A2;
Michael Gardner, Cities in California Push Own Measure on Eminent Domain, S.D. UNIONTRIBUNE, March 14, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/
20070314-9999-1n14domain.html.
157.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

158. See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 254 (1987) (utility pole rent
review does not constitute a taking and is not confiscatory where it provides for
reasonable recovery of costs); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538-39 (1992)
(because a mobile home ordinance does not compel owners to suffer physical
occupation of their property it does not constitute a taking); Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-125 (1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342-343 (2002); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540
(2005); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493.
159.

See note 139, supra.

160.

Hubbard v. Brown, 785 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Cal. 1990).

161.

514 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
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proposition that "a grazing permit on the National Forest does not give
ownership of the land or of any legal interest therein."162 The Montana
Supreme Court also refers favorably to federal case law stating that "permits
could be withdrawn or cancelled by the Government at any time without
constitutional obligation to pay compensation therefore [sic]."163 From this
survey, it appears that state law generally supports the federal primacy
theory espoused by Colvin Cattle that "[grazing on federal public lands] . . .
was, and remains, a privilege, not a right."164
Ambiguities do remain in the law of Utah, Oregon, Washington, Idaho,
and Wyoming. Given these ambiguities, it is possible that the Supreme
Court could mandate that, where state property law ambiguities exist,
questions of state law should be certified to the state supreme court. This
hypothetical, however, is based on a number of conditions: (1) a fact pattern
sufficiently sympathetic to state property law analysis; (2) a plaintiff willing
to brave the hostile precedent of Colvin Cattle; (3) a Supreme Court
sufficiently interested in furthering the certification doctrine used by the
court in Walker165; and (4) ambiguous state property law. A conjunction of
these conditions appears, at the present time, rather unlikely.
VI.

Analysis of Related Cases in Light of Colvin Cattle
A.

Colvin Cattle Should Result in Final Judgment Against
the Plaintiff in Hage

Colvin Cattle should have a strong influence on other cases pending in
the Court of Federal Claims, as well as on those cases which have already
been decided but seem to conflict with its ruling and are still ripe for
appeal.166 In fact, it seems likely Colvin Cattle will end up having a kind of

162. Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 524 (Colo. 1982)
(citing Cienega Cattle Co. v. Atkins, 126 P.2d 481, 484 (Ariz. 1942)).
163. Ivins v. Hardy, 333 P.3d 471, 479 (Mont. 1958) (citing United States v.
Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir., 1951)).
164. Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918)).
165.

See supra note 115.

166. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (federal government water use restrictions under the Endangered Species Act
were held to be a per se taking of plaintiff’s water rights under Loretto v. Teleprompter
Mahattan CatV Corp.; 458 U.S. 419 (1982)); Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222 (Ct.
Fed. Cl. 2005); Sacramento Grazing Ass’n., Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 211 (Ct. Fed. Cl.
2005) (association's claim for compensation for the alleged taking of its preference
grazing right dismissed with prejudice because no property interest was attached);
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domino effect, solving a controversy which has raged through the West for
the last fifteen years.
Even with all rulings interlocutory and the parties still awaiting a final
resolution, the Hage litigation, filed in 1991, was the primary instigator of
this controversy.167 The facts in Hage are remarkably similar to those just
examined in Colvin Cattle; both cases involve ranchers in a dispute with the
federal agency charged with administering federal grazing lands.168 Wayne
Hage claimed property rights in the surface estate covered by his grazing
permits, and in the grazing permits themselves.169 As in Colvin Cattle, the
Federal Circuit Court in Hage dismissed these claims: "The plaintiffs have
shown no evidence and have no legal support to sustain a viable claim for a
property interest in grazing permits or a surface estate."170
Basing its reasoning on language which vests a property right in the
beneficial appropriation of water "by watering livestock directly from the
source,"171 the Federal Circuit Court implied the existence of an appurtenant
right to graze livestock alongside such sources in a sort of right-of-way which
extends fifty feet on both sides of a ditch.172 Significantly, nowhere in the
court's "FINAL OPINION: Findings of Fact"173 does it hold that Hage actually
possesses a vested property interest in forage appurtenant to his water
rights. Instead, the Hage court leaves this all-important question for a later
proceeding.174 However, even the hint of the possibility of an appurtenant
right to forage which attaches to state water rights has been enough to stir
up an impressive amount of litigation.175
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit tellingly chooses not to
address the Hage series of cases in its Colvin Cattle opinion. It would appear
that the Federal Circuit is not interested in issuing opinions on cases that
are not yet final, perhaps preferring to set precedent and let the district

and Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2002) (motion to dismiss takings
claim concerning vested water rights has been denied).
167. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996), Hage v. United States,
42 Fed. Cl. 249 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1998), and Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002)
(final finding of fact, leaving determination of actual taking to a later proceeding).
168.

Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. at 573; Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153-55.

169.

Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. at 573-74.

170.

Id. at 574.

171.

Id. at 577 (citations omitted).

172.

Id. at 581.

173.

Id. at 592.

174.

Id.

175. According to a Lexis search, Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (Ct. Fed.
Cl. 1996) has been cited 90 times, Hage v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 249 (Ct. Fed. Cl
1998) has been cited 18 times, and Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 has been cited 32 times.
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courts do their jobs. However, with its straightforward rationale and
succinct treatment of the issues in Colvin Cattle,176 the Federal Circuit obviates
the Hage court's attempts to insert unnecessary complexity177 into an issue
the Federal Circuit believes was thoroughly settled long ago.178
Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to imagine that Colvin Cattle will not
finally settle the Hage cases once and for all. Colvin Cattle rejects almost every
substantive legal theory advanced by the Plaintiff in Hage: (1) that federal
regulation of grazing effectuates a taking; (2) that Plaintiff should be
compensated under 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g)(2003); (3) that water rights in a ditch
include the right to graze cattle along the ditch right of way; (4) that reduction
in flows due to federal land management practices effectuated a taking of
Plaintiff's property; and (5) that by cooperating with Nevada officials in elk
reintroduction efforts the federal government effectuated a taking of Plaintiff's
private property.179 The Hage court is bound by the decision in Colvin Cattle
which states that "[grazing on federal public lands] . . . was, and remains, a
privilege, not a right."180 The delay on the part of Judge Loren Smith in issuing
a final ruling, sixteen years after the litigation was filed and a year after the
holding in Colvin Cattle, is inexplicable.

B.

Colvin Cattle Persuades the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Walker

Walker181 is one of the cases spawned by the original Hage opinion, and
is very similar to both Colvin Cattle and Hage, though importantly the
litigation is set in New Mexico rather than Nevada.182 The Court of Federal

176.

See note 111, supra.

177. The last Hage decision, issued in 2002, comes in at around 92 pages.
Hage, 51 Fed. Cl. 570.
178. Federal law recognizes state water rights, but without express
congressional authorization there can be no appurtenant right to graze. Colvin Cattle
Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d, 803 808 (2006) (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,
539-40 (1976)).
179. See Supplemental Memorandum of Amici Curiae Nevada Department of
Wildlife Et Al., Regarding the Federal Circuit’s Decision in Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States
(Fed. Cl. No. 91-1470L), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_
research/documents/RT_Briefs_PostColvinSupp.pdf.
180.
(1918)).

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807 (citing Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352

181. Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005) (certified to the
New Mexico Supreme Court), see note 114, supra.
182.
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Claims in Walker, faced with essentially the same issues at bar in Colvin
Cattle,183 but without the relative clarity of Nevada law,184 found itself
decidedly unsure of the proper interpretation of state property law as it
applied to water and forage rights, and so certified these questions to the
New Mexico Supreme Court.185
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that no state property right
existed on which to base a federal takings claim.186 The court reinforced its
opinion with a discussion of water rights in the Western U.S., stating that
such rights are separate property rights which can be severed from the land
which gave rise to them.187 Such rights can also be acquired independently
of the land,188 and that therefore the water right does not imply an ongoing
right to continue the use of the federal land in the manner that gave rise to
the right originally. This general structure is known as the "prior
appropriations doctrine."
The Walker decision discusses the historical pressures which resulted
in the domination of Western water law by the prior appropriation
doctrine.189 Of relevance to our treatment of Colvin Cattle is the theory that
prior appropriation developed because the traditional Eastern riparian
doctrine's insistence on proof that reasonable use did not affect
downstream users was impractical for Western users who often had to divert
water for many miles in order to put it to beneficial use.190 This explains why
water in the West is considered a separate property right: "all water rights,
even if appurtenant to a certain piece of land, can be severed from that land
and applied to another use at a different location."191 Under New Mexico

183.

Id. at 225.

184.

Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d at 807-808.

185. See note 114, supra. In a subsequent proceeding, the Court of Federal
Claims in Walker further explained its justification for certification, washing its hands
of the case until the New Mexico Supreme Court comes to a decision. Walker v. United
States, 72 Fed. Cl. 186 (2006) (decision denying defendant’s requests for summary
judgment and finding no error in earlier certification decision). The certification
proceeding has been argued and briefed before the New Mexico Supreme Court,
and a final decision, and a final decision issued. Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d
882 (N.M. 2007).
186.

Id. at 896.

187.

Id. at 889. These rights are termed “riparian rights.” Id.

188.

Id. These rights are termed “appropriative rights.” Id.

189.

Id. at 888-890.

190.

Id. at 889.

191. Id. at 891 (citations omitted). The Walker court concluded that, as far as
New Mexico law was concerned,
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law, such rights can be used to exclude others from use of the water, but
cannot be used to establish a separate interest in the public domain.192 This
certainly settles the federal case, as far as the New Mexico Supreme Court is
concerned — without any vested state property right, the Walkers have no
Fifth Amendment Takings claim against the federal government.
Under Colvin Cattle, the Federal Circuit Court in Walker erred in certifying
its questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court in the first place. As noted
earlier, there remains a certain level of ambiguity in the Colvin Cattle decision
as a result of the Federal Circuit's partial reliance on Nevada state law in
that case.193 However, as discussed above, the federal law justification for
Colvin Cattle stands on its own two feet, without any help from state law.194 It
is a distinct possibility that if the court's opinion in Colvin Cattle been issued
at the time the Federal Circuit Court in Walker issued its certification
decision, no certification would have occurred.195
Indeed, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued an opinion in June of
2007 that could be read as critical of the Federal Circuit Court's decision to

the requirement that water must be put to beneficial use does not
give rise to an interminable right to continue that same beneficial
use. For example, if one acquires a water right by beneficially
using water in a milling operation, which operation is
subsequently shut down due to environmental violations, the mill
operator cannot claim a right to continue milling just to protect
the water rights. In this case, the Walkers' ability to acquire and
use their water right on the allotments was conditioned on the
permission of the federal government to go on the land. The
Walkers were thus responsible for maintaining their license to
graze on the public land, and since they lost that license, they
cannot now rely on a right to continue a particular beneficial use
to maintain the water right that they were able to acquire by way
of government permission in the first place. Because the Walkers
chose not to comply with the government's permitting process,
they took the risk of either forfeiting their water right through nonuse or being forced to transfer, lease, or sell that right.
Id. at 892 (citations omitted).
192.

Id. at 891.

193.

See V. Analysis of the Decision in Colvin Cattle, supra.

194.

See V. A. Federal Law Can Stand Alone, supra.

195. Walker v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 222 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2005), was certified on
October 31, 2005, and subsequently affirmed by Walker, 72 Fed. Cl. 186 (Ct. Fed. Cl.
2006) on July 21, 2006. Colvin Cattle, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006), was not decided
until November 1, 2006.
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certify.196 The highest court in New Mexico spent six of the fourteen pages it
wrote in Walker addressing the underlying federal case and governing federal
precedents.197 On the Hage series of cases, the New Mexico court further
opines that,
[w]hile not expressly overruling Hage, both Colvin opinions
held that Nevada law does not support a claim identical to
what the Walkers assert here and similar to what the
ranchers said in Hage. . . . Thus, it appears that all federal
authority on this matter is contrary to the position the
Walkers now ask this Court to endorse. For these reasons,
we expressly decline to follow the rationale put forth in the
[Hage] opinion.198
As far as the New Mexico Supreme Court is concerned, Colvin is now
settled law and the Hage aberration has been put to rest.
VII. Conclusion
Given the likely disposition of both Hage and Walker under the Colvin
Cattle court's analysis, it is clear that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is well on its way to putting the Hage series of cases to bed.
Arguably, an already overwhelming body of federal law was stacked against
possessory interests for those utilizing the public domain for grazing. Now
this body of federal law has been buttressed by treating Hage as an aberration.
While this might finally spell an end to sixteen years of litigation for
Wayne Hage, it cannot be satisfying for the ranchers whose livelihoods hang
by the thread of federal regulation and revocable grazing permits. Since the
days when federal lands were a commons, open to anyone with the fortitude
to drive a herd of cows out to pasture, conflict has surrounded the range
resource.199 The Walker court characterized its plaintiffs as "attempting to
wage a battle lost at the turn of the last century."200 Over a century's worth of
legal battles seem unlikely to be resolved by another legal precedent when
the socio-political forces driving the combatants remain unchanged. A dead
end at Colvin Cattle is not likely to discourage the small but determined
faction of ranchers who continue to seek private property protections for
their grazing privileges.

196.

Walker, 162 P.3d 882.

197.

Id. at 882-88.

198.

Id. at 888.

199.

See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 4.

200.

Walker, 162 P.3d at 895.
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VIII. Postscript
It seems a happy ending was not in store for the Colvin Company. In
August of 2007, William Colvin brought suit in Oregon against his brother,
and fellow shareholder in the Colvin Company, Ben Colvin, and against his
brother's wife, Juanita Colvin.201 As stated earlier, Ben Colvin decided to
move most of his cattle from the 40 Bar Ranch because wild horses and
burros were reducing the profitability of the herd.202 William Colvin knew
about the transfer of the herd, but he did not know about Ben Colvin's
refusal to pay federal grazing fees and the resulting conflict with BLM
agents — indeed, Ben Colvin did not inform his brother, the president of
Colvin, that he had lost the company's grazing permits.203
Eventually, Ben Colvin was forced to sell the remainder of his cattle,
which had been pastured in Washington State, in order to cover his
mounting legal fees and living expenses.204 Because he had proceeded
without the authorization or knowledge of his brother, William, the parties
agreed that they had to split up the company and go their separate ways.205
As with many such agreements, this one ended up in court with William
Colvin seeking a declaratory judgment that Ben had acted without the
authorization of the company and that as a result, all operating losses from
the 40 Bar Ranch, all legal fees associated with the lawsuit, and all fees and
trespass penalties associated with the grazing permit dispute should be
charged against Ben personally.206
In Colvin Cattle, we find brother fighting brother, a family in crisis, and a
way of life fast fading into the sunset of the American West as a land of
limitless resources and wide-open pastures. The court in Colvin v. Colvin held
that,
[b]y withholding grazing fees (and ultimately losing the
Corporation's grazing rights) and selling the brood herd,
Ben essentially rendered the 40 Bar Ranch a defunct cattle

201. Colvin v. Colvin, Civil No. 05-409-AA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57213, *1 (D. Or.
Aug. 1, 2007).
202.

Id. at *4-5.

203.

Id. at *11-12.

204. Id. at *14-15. As was also noted above, “the Court of Claims dismissed
Ben’s lawsuit, and on November 1, 2006, the dismissal was upheld by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. . . . Accordingly, the Corporation has no grazing rights
on adjacent federal land and will not be compensated for the loss of such rights,
rendering it impossible for the 40 Bar Ranch to maintain a viable cattle operation.”
Id. at *16-17 (citation omitted).
205.

Id at *14-15.

206.

Id. at *17-18.
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operation, contrary to the Corporation's purpose. Moreover,
in appealing the BLM's decision and filing suit against the
federal government, Ben incurred tremendous legal fees
and placed the Corporation's assets at risk - decisions that
are not within Ben's ordinary course of business in running
the Nevada operation.207
In an interesting bit of dicta, the court found that Ben Colvin's decision
to fight the federal government was based on "the widespread belief of cattle
ranchers in Nevada that public rangelands were not property of the United
States and that the BLM had no regulatory authority over the Montezuma
Allotment."208
The court found that Ben Colvin was personally responsible for the
loss of the Company's assets in Nevada.209 Explaining its rationale, the court
says,
it appears likely that Ben became caught up in the property
rights agenda promoted by fellow ranchers and took a
stand against the federal government and the BLM. That
was his choice, but it was not a reasonable choice under
the circumstances or one that was in the best interests of
the Corporation. Accordingly, the financial consequences
flowing from that choice must be borne by Ben personally.210
It seems clear, at least to this court, that "grazing leases, permits, or
preferences do not confer a compensable property right in the underlying
land."211 Indeed, the court further characterizes the chance that a court would
find that water rights conferred a right to graze cattle as "slim-to-none."212
It seems that we are witnessing the end of a chapter in the continuing
battle between federal land managers and local cattle ranchers. Realizing
that seizing cattle was ineffective, the Justice Department, as of August 31,
2007, has filed criminal trespass charges against Ben Colvin and William

207. Id. at *27-28. Additionally, the court went on to “find that Ben’s decision
to withhold payment of grazing fees — ultimately resulting in the loss of grazing
rights on the Montezuma Allotment and the seizure of the Corporation cattle — went
far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment.” Id. at *30.
208.

Id. at *33.

209.

Id. at *40-41.

210.

Id. at *35 (citation omitted).

211.

Id. at *36.

212.

Id. at *40.
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Hage.213 According to the prosecutor in charge of the government's case,
trespass charges are the only avenue left to the government for enforcement
because of a new state law which obstructs the issuance of cattle ownership
certificates — without which certificates, cattle seized by the BLM cannot be
resold at auction.214 Thus the battle continues on a different front, and
another chapter opens in the courts.

213. Sandra Chereb, Feds File Trespass Lawsuit Against Nevada Ranchers, JACKSON HOLE
STAR TRIBUNE, September 2, 2007, available at http://www.jacksonholestartrib.com/articles/
2007/09/02/news/regional/c564fb1f971d271f87257348006c7a5f.txt; Mark Waite, Justice
Department Sues Two Well-Known Sagebrush Rebels, PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES, August 31, 2007,
available at http://www.pahrumpvalleytimes.com/2007/Aug-31-Fri-2007/news/16393232.
html.
214. Chereb, supra note 213; 2005 Nev. Stat. 1238 (codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. §
565.125 (2007) (amending Nevada’s state brand ordinance to require a mandatory
hearing before a state judge before any federal seizure of cattle). Notable among
those testifying in favor of strengthening the bill’s protection of private property are
Ben Colvin, Helen Chenoweth-Hage, and Wayne Hage. The minutes of the
committee meeting show the deference paid to these Sagebrush luminaries. Minutes
of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Natural Resources, Agriculture, and Mining, 73rd
Session (April 6, 2005), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/73rd/Minutes/Assembly/
NR/Final/3923.pdf.
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